Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/firewalla-mcp-server

firewalla-mcp-server@2.1.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Real-time network monitoring, security analysis, and firewall management through 28 specialized tools. Access security alerts, network flows, device status, and firewall rules directly from your Firewalla device." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher amittell · joined 0 days agoInstalls 31,118Last detonated 45 min ago
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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/validation/error-handler.ts:844 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/launch-smoke.mjs:241 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/validation/error-handler.ts:798 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/validation/error-handler.ts:1315 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/skills/firewalla/SKILL.md:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/functional-test.mjs:243 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/functional-test.mjs:243 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/launch-smoke.mjs:9 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/monitoring/logger.ts:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/launch-smoke.mjs:134 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/http-transport.ts:473 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim amittell: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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