firecrawl@3.38.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Search, scrape, and interact with the web for AI agents. Turn any URL into clean Markdown or structured JSON, search the live web and specialized indexes, parse documents, crawl and map sites, and watch pages for changes." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher firecrawl · publishing for 637 daysInstalls 154KLast detonated 12d ago
$docker run -i --rm mcp/firecrawl
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try firecrawl` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 3.36.0

vet-skills diff firecrawl 3.36.0 3.38.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.36.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/image.yml:29 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesrun: echo "version=$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/integration-tag.test.mjs:83 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/surface-common.mjs:406 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(formatDiff(differences, inputs));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/helpers/exchange-mcp.mjs:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/contract-snapshot.test.mjs:267 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst child = spawnServer({ ...BASE_ENV, PORT: String(port), ...env });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/mcp-smoke.test.mjs:106 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/contract-snapshot.test.mjs:282 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst { client, init } = await startStdio(t, { ...BASE_ENV, ...env });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/surface-common.mjs:389 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (input.endsWith('.json')) return JSON.parse(readFileSync(input, 'utf8'));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/alexandria-output.ts:78 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…de in data.alexandria[0].data. Reuse workspaceId with command to filter response.json using jq, grep, head or sed; combine related projections and return small slices, not the full file. saveOutput:true retains large command output in virt…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/publish.yml:48 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesrun: echo "version=$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/mcp-smoke.test.mjs:2233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/surface-common.mjs:179 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv: { ...process.env, ...BASE_ENV, ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈36 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

firecrawl@3.38.0 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills