Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/fetch

fetch@2026.11.11

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Fetches a URL from the internet and extracts its contents as markdown" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher modelcontextprotocol · publishing for 726 daysInstalls 2MLast detonated 3d ago
$docker run -i --rm mcp/fetch
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- docker run -i --rm mcp/fetch

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:164 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Using Docker</summary> ```json { "mcp": { "servers": { "fetch": { "command": "docker", "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "mcp/fetch"] } } } } ```Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_protocol.py:1095 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsmetadata = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_protocol.py:916 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsmetadata = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_server_fetch/readability_js.py:90 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_server_fetch/readability_js.py:118 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_server_fetch/readability_js.py:108 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Whatever the tree kill did, the direct child is certainly gone after this.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_non_cp1252_pages.py:24 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentBOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:103 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Using docker</summary> ```json { "mcpServers": { "fetch": { "command": "docker", "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "mcp/fetch"] } } } ```Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_protocol.py:1106 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsmetadata_robots = "http://169.254.169.254/robots.txt"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_server_fetch/readability_js.py:128 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# timeout can kill the processes it starts as well.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_readability_subprocess.py:482 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(["true"], start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_readability_subprocess.py:456 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# group kill and keeps stdout and stderr open; the run must still end.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_allowed_hosts.py:296 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetunlisted = await session.call_tool("fetch", {"url": "http://10.0.0.2/"})Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_allowed_hosts.py:282 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetinternal = "http://10.0.0.1/status"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_readability_subprocess.py:133 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# child of its own, which the timeout must kill as well.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_allowed_hosts.py:298 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert text_of(unlisted) == TOOL_ERROR + refused("http://10.0.0.2/", "10.0.0.2")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈39 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

fetch@2026.11.11 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills