Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/cyreslab-ai-shodan

cyreslab-ai-shodan@0.2.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Shodan — host/network recon, CVE and exploit lookup, InternetDB, and persistent ..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher cyreslab-ai · joined 0 days agoInstalls 46,841Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Pipe-to-shell pattern; File permission modification command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternDockerfile:7 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
File permission modification commandpackage.json:34 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
File permission modification commandDockerfile:7 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellDockerfile:7 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive file system command detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cyreslab-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +4 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to Docker MCP Catalog, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim cyreslab-ai