Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/azure

azure@r6

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "The Azure MCP Server, bringing the power of Azure to your agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher microsoft · joined 12 days agoInstalls 75,534Last detonated 2d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is azure@r6 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-01 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address; Coercive compliance language. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentservers/Azure.Mcp.Server/README.md:76 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP address.github/skills/harden-tool-url-inputs/SKILL.md:293 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioneng/common/scripts/eval/build-eval-summary.ts:415 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP address.github/skills/harden-tool-url-inputs/SKILL.md:287 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Coercive compliance languageservers/Fabric.Mcp.Server/README.md:1101 · Coercive compliance languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentservers/Fabric.Mcp.Server/README.md:74 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
False authorization claimservers/Fabric.Mcp.Server/README.md:259 · False authorization claim — impersonating privileged roleFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Coercive compliance languageservers/Azure.Mcp.Server/README.md:1584 · Coercive compliance languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageservers/Fabric.Mcp.Server/README.md:419 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioneng/common/scripts/eval/build-eval-summary.ts:398 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
False authorization claimservers/Fabric.Mcp.Server/README.md:274 · False authorization claim — impersonating privileged roleFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/agents/onboarding.agent.md:78 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentservers/Azure.Mcp.Server/README.md:100 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Cross-server tool reference.github/agents/onboarding.agent.md:156 · Cross-server tool reference — agent may chain tools across untrusted MCP serversFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageservers/Fabric.Mcp.Server/README.md:432 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP address.github/skills/harden-tool-url-inputs/SKILL.md:287 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP address.github/skills/harden-tool-url-inputs/SKILL.md:293 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageservers/Fabric.Mcp.Server/README.md:914 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialseng/common/scripts/eval/test/shard-results.test.ts:568 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioneng/common/scripts/eval/lib/shard-results.ts:252 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim microsoft: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. Cross-server tool reference≈ +4 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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