Skills/ClawHub/zz-chat

zz-chat@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "爪爪/钳钳 — 手机直连 OpenClaw 聊天。触发词:钳钳、爪爪、钱钱、龙虾、聊天机器人、创建爪爪、安装钳钳、打开钳钳、zz-chat。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher badxtdss · publishing for 228 daysInstalls 933Last detonated 7d ago
$clawhub install zz-chat
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbridge.js:75 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[回] → #${sender}: ${reply.slice(0, 80)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbridge.py:83 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbridge.js:67 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[收] #${sender}: ${content.slice(0, 80)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwatchdog.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionworker.js:70 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (request.method === 'PUT') { const body = await request.json(); const raw = await env.ZZ_STORE.get(key); const q = raw ? JSON.parse(raw) : []; q.push(body); if (q.length > 100) q.splice(0, q.lengthFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionworker.js:57 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (request.method === 'POST') { const body = await request.json(); const raw = await env.ZZ_STORE.get(key); const q = raw ? JSON.parse(raw) : []; q.push(body); if (q.length > 30) q.splice(0, q.lengthFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,653 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.