Skills/ClawHub/zoom-meeting-assistance-with-rtms-unofficial-community-skill

zoom-meeting-assistance-with-rtms-unofficial-community-skill@0.1.3

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Zoom RTMS Meeting Assistant — start on-demand to capture meeting audio, video, transcript, screenshare, and chat via Zoom Real-Time Media Streams. Handles meeting.rtms_started and meeting.rtms_stopped webhook events. Provides AI-powered dialog suggestions, sentiment analysis, and live summaries with WhatsApp notifications. Use when a Zoom RTMS webhook fires or the user asks to record/analyze a meeting." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher tanchunsiong · publishing for 291 daysInstalls 3,484Last detonated 51 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is zoom-meeting-assistance-with-rtms-unofficial-community-skill@0.1.3 safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathschatWithClawdbot.js:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconsole.warn('⚠️ OPENCLAW_NOTIFY_TARGET not set in .env. Skipping notification.');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionchatWithClawdbot.js:112 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('🤖 Sending to OpenClaw agent (fast)...');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.js:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from a .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionconvertMeetingMedia.js:28 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`🎵 Converting audio: ${file} -> ${path.basename(outputWav)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmuxMixedAudioAndActiveSpeakerVideo.js:34 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('✅ Muxing completed. Output file created:', outputPath);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionchatWithClawdbot.js:90 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('🤖 Sending to OpenClaw agent...');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionconvertMeetingMedia.js:41 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`🎥 Converting video: ${file} -> ${path.basename(outputMp4)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSet these in the skill's `.env` file:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmuxMixedAudioAndActiveSpeakerVideo.js:30 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`🎥 Muxing activespeakervideo.mp4 + mixedaudio.wav -> final_output.mp4`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,865 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tanchunsiong: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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