yuzhua@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Install, start, stop, and health-check Yuzhua (gesture + voice + OpenClaw gateway) with minimal manual setup." Observed in sandbox: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher juguangyuan520-dotcom · publishing for 259 daysInstalls 1,140Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 4 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
2.0sfilesystemread ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/config · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/packed-refs · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/HEAD · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/refs/ · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/info/grafts · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/shallow outside project
2.0sfilesystemwrote ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/description · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/info/exclude · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/hooks/pre-rebase.sample · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/hooks/pre-commit.sample · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/hooks/update.sample · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/hooks/post-update.sample
2.0snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
2.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
2.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
2.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
2.0sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git
2.0sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git-remote-https
2.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
2.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
2.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
2.1snetworkGET http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/status · not in the allow-list, refused
2.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
2.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
2.1sprocessexited 1:
2.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
2.1sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
2.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
2.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
3.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
3.8sfilesystemread ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/HEAD outside project
3.8sfilesystemwrote ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/objects/maintenance.lock · ~/.openclaw/workspace/apps/Yuzhua/.git/ORIG_HEAD.lock
3.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
3.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
3.8sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git
3.8sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git-remote-https
3.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslog "Created .env from .env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp "${YUZHUA_HOME}/.env.example" "${YUZHUA_HOME}/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:83 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- For first run, users may still need to fill token values in `.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:57 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${YUZHUA_HOME}/start.sh" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:82 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Never commit `.env` or any real keys.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f "${YUZHUA_HOME}/.env" ] && [ -f "${YUZHUA_HOME}/.env.example" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- create `.env` from `.env.example` when neededFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/stop.sh:28 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -9 ${pids} || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/stop.sh:23 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill ${pids} || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesThis skill is designed for local machines and keeps secrets in `.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈535 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim juguangyuan520-dotcom: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim juguangyuan520-dotcomPropose a patch to the maintainer