Skills/ClawHub/yuanlin-suanliang

yuanlin-suanliang@0.4.41

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "园林统计苗木、算铺装面积;不替代结算。触发词:园林算量、苗木、绿化。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher lisong2003-lgtm · publishing for 38 daysInstalls 664Last detonated 27 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.4.40

vet-skills diff yuanlin-suanliang 0.4.40 0.4.41

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.4.40 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.4.40 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 2: contract_guard.py: error: 需要契约路径,或用 --self-test
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 2: lint_cross_platform.py: error: the following arguments are required: paths
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sfilesystemread ~/.cache/codex-runtimes/ · ~/.workbuddy/skills/ outside project
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocess8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/self_test.py:62 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(cwd), env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/runtime_env.sh:18 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfind "$SKILL_DIR/scripts" -maxdepth 1 -type f \( -name '*.sh' -o -name '*.py' \) ! -perm -u+x -exec chmod +x {} + 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/tests/test_yuanlin_qty.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/tests/test_yuanlin_qty.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/yuanlin_qty.py:1150 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingscripts/tests/test_yuanlin_qty.py:28 · Dynamic module loadingHAS_OPENPYXL = importlib.util.find_spec("openpyxl") is not NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/lint_cross_platform.py:105 · Python subprocess execution detected# 仅对命令类规则,在 .py 里只追 subprocess.run([...]) 这样的真实调用。Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/lint_cross_platform.py:67 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"dylib 是 macOS 原生库格式。fix: 仓库内 sudo 二进制请走 platform 分支;Windows/Linux 由 pip wheel 提供"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈851 tok
1 file · 56 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lisong2003-lgtm: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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