yt2podcast@0.2.4
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "把 YouTube 视频变成中文音频播客：NotebookLM Audio Overview 生成、ffmpeg 转码，再上传小宇宙（上传即进入平台审核，通过后自动上线；可用 --hold-upload 在上传前停下）；完成后回推一条结果通知。用户从微信/聊天里发来 YouTube 链接时使用。" Observed in sandbox: sends data to lh3.googleusercontent.com.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 51/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: document.cookie access; document.cookie access. Summary: sends data to lh3.googleusercontent.com.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenariost+CategoryObserved action
0.2sfilesystemread ~/.opencli/clis/notebooklm/download-audio.js · ~/.opencli/clis/xiaoyuzhou/upload.js · ~/.opencli/clis/xiaoyuzhou/upload-status.js outside project
0.2sfilesystemwrote ~/.opencli/clis/notebooklm/download-audio.js · ~/.opencli/clis/xiaoyuzhou/upload.js · ~/.opencli/clis/xiaoyuzhou/upload-status.js
0.2snetworkCONNECT https://lh3.googleusercontent.com · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cmp
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5sfilesystemread ~/.opencli/clis/notebooklm/download-audio.js · ~/.opencli/clis/xiaoyuzhou/upload.js · ~/.opencli/clis/xiaoyuzhou/upload-status.js outside project
0.5sfilesystemwrote ~/.opencli/clis/notebooklm/download-audio.js · ~/.opencli/clis/xiaoyuzhou/upload.js · ~/.opencli/clis/xiaoyuzhou/upload-status.js
0.5snetworkCONNECT https://lh3.googleusercontent.com · not in the allow-list, refused
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/cmp
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.5sprocessexited 1:
Static findings
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/resume-stalled.py:136 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05code = subprocess.call([sys.executable, str(WORKER), item["job_id"]])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.HIGH
document.cookie accessadapters/xiaoyuzhou/upload-status.js:77 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies
AST07const token = (document.cookie.match(/x-jike-access-token=([^;]+)/) || [])[1] || '';Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.HIGH
document.cookie accessadapters/xiaoyuzhou/upload.js:228 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies
AST07const token = (document.cookie.match(/x-jike-access-token=([^;]+)/) || [])[1] || '';Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/resume-stalled.py:54 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/new-job.sh:209 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05if [ -n "$LOCK_PID" ] && kill -0 "$LOCK_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:139 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05> ⚠️ 关键坑：OpenClaw 的 exec 在回合结束时会 kill 整个进程组（日志里能看到Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/worker.py:256 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/worker.py:297 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Instructions loaded
≈2,772 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
29 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim seuwangcy: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- document.cookie access≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim seuwangcyPropose a patch to the maintainer