yidun-skill-sec@1.0.1
BLOCKED· static onlyPublisher claims: "Intelligent code security scanner with hybrid local-cloud detection. Fingerprints packages, runs static behavioral analysis, and consults cloud threat intell..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 47/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Prompt injection; Reads credential paths from the home directory; Reads credential paths from the home directory. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
jailbreak persona triggers, and SYSTEM-level injection markers in non-system contexts).Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.| `FS_READ_SENSITIVE` | Reads from `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.aws`, `~/.config/gh` | +30 |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."context": "open(os.path.expanduser('~/.ssh/<KEY_FILE>')).read()"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."context": "subprocess.run([<SHELL_CMD>], shell=True)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.| `FS_READ_SENSITIVE` | Reads from `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.aws`, `~/.config/gh` | +30 |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."context": "os.system('<PRIV_CMD>')"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.| `/home/dev/.aws/credentials` | `~/.aws/<CREDENTIALS>` |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.| `PRIV_ESCALATION` | `sudo`, `chmod 777`, `setuid` patterns | +30 |Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.| Code comments | Match is on a line starting with `#`, `//`, `/* */`, `<!-- -->`, or language-specific comment markers | `# Example: sudo chmod 777 /tmp` |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo invocations|chmod with world-writable bits|chown to root|setuid patternsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.| `/Users/john/.ssh/id_rsa` | `~/.ssh/<PRIVATE_KEY>` |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.| Code comments | Match is on a line starting with `#`, `//`, `/* */`, `<!-- -->`, or language-specific comment markers | `# Example: sudo chmod 777 /tmp` |Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.sudo invocations|chmod with world-writable bits|chown to root|setuid patternsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
33 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yd-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- OS command execution function call detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.