xinjianxue-skill-job-change-global@1.0.1
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "XinJianXue "Job-Change Decision Advisor" skill package (job_change). EN keywords: XinJianXue advisor skill — relationship analysis, personality & behavior reading, emotional guidance. Keywords: xinjianxue, relationship-analysis, personality-analysis, behavior-pattern, psychology, advisor-skill, emotional-support. Activation conditions (**both must be met**; and **you must confirm with the user first** that this analysis is wanted; do not trigger when the user has not clearly asked for this service): 1. The user's question **clearly falls within the scope of the "Job-Change Decision Advisor"** (scope below under "This Advisor's Positioning"), or the user explicitly names this advisor; 2. The subject of analysis is the user, or someone the user **has explicitly mentioned and agreed** to analyze; **never analyze a third party who was neither mentioned nor agreed to**. Onboarding requirement (a one-time step on first run, **not** an activation condition): on first run the AI must apply for a business license first, then use the user's AI authorization code to bind the account; every call afterwards carries the license + api_key dual credentials. ⛔ Non-activation cases (explicit negative examples — if any one of them is hit, do **not** call this service): - Casual chit-chat, general emotional venting, comfort chat; - The user supplied only a date / time without stating its purpose, or has not confirmed they want this analysis; - The subject to be analyzed is a third party who was **not mentioned or has not agreed** (e.g. "check this person out for me" when that person has not agreed); - The question falls outside this advisor's scope (it belongs to another advisor or another domain)." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
No other findings across 356 lines in 2 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim weixin97676414: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.