Skills/ClawHub/xiaozhiclaw

xiaozhiclaw@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "XiaoZhi AI Device (ESP32) integration for OpenClaw. Enables real-time voice interaction with your AI assistant through XiaoZhi hardware. Supports WebSocket b..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher leohuang8688 · publishing for 251 daysInstalls 1,289Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Authorization escalation language; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/channel.ts:60 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Sending to XiaoZhi ${account.deviceId}: ${message}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/websocket-server.ts:160 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`🔊 Sending TTS response: "${text}"`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.ts:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:27 · Authorization escalation language- ❌ No Admin/Root Privileges RequiredFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/doubao-service.ts:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,254 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim leohuang8688: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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