Skills/ClawHub/xiaohongshu-publish-attach

xiaohongshu-publish-attach@0.0.3

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Auto-publish Xiaohongshu long-form notes on Linux (Chrome attach/VNC). Agent writes title+body then exec xhs_publish.sh with --publish --submit. Triggers 小红书..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher m-lemon · publishing for 166 daysInstalls 885Last detonated 4 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_chromedriver.sh:97 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 644 "$ENV_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_chromedriver.sh:90 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 755 "$DEST"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_chromedriver.sh:10 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# CHROMEDRIVER_INSTALL_DIR=/usr/local/bin # use: sudo env CHROMEDRIVER_INSTALL_DIR=... bash ...Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:8 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR"/*.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_chromedriver.sh:70 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "WARN: /usr/local/bin is not writable — use sudo or let this script use ~/.local/bin:" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_chromedriver.sh:71 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " sudo env CHROMEDRIVER_INSTALL_DIR=/usr/local/bin bash $0" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_chromedriver.sh:83 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "unzip is required. On RHEL/Fedora: sudo dnf install -y unzip" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_chromedriver.sh:53 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " sudo dnf install -y https://dl.google.com/linux/chrome/rpm/stable/x86_64/google-chrome-stable-*.rpm" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
document.cookie accessscripts/xhs_attach_standalone.py:282 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookiesvar hasA1 = document.cookie.indexOf('a1=') >= 0;Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈571 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim m-lemon: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. document.cookie access≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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