Skills/ClawHub/xhs-comments

xhs-comments@1.0.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "小红书笔记评论分步采集工具(用户洞察,会话制)。当用户需要采集/查询小红书笔记的评论内容——昵称、评论正文、点赞数、IP 属地、子评论数,按页逐步采集并实时返回给用户、可按需展开子评论、导出评论明细 CSV(Excel 直开),或提到"小红书评论采集/评论内容/评论抓取/用户评论/评论导出/舆情/笔记评论"时使用本 skill。适合评论区舆情监测、用户反馈收集、爆款笔记评论洞察、KOL 粉丝声音分析等场景。**转链与互动数采集免费;每采一页主评论或展开一次子评论扣 1 点数(注册送 10 点)。**" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher mystery77777777 · publishing for 57 daysInstalls 437Last detonated 29 min ago
$clawhub install xhs-comments
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.0.1

vet-skills diff xhs-comments 1.0.1 1.0.2

This version reaches for something 1.0.1 did not: 1 new host (aidata366.com) · 1 new credential variable (NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
aidata366.com
New credential variables
NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: AI 来源参数(所有 API 命令必填): --skill-name <本Skill名> --ai-entry <AI工具标识>
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/config.js:49 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// 配置文件含 token, 尽力收紧为仅本人可读写 (Windows 上 chmod 语义有限, 失败忽略)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/config.js:29 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// 尽力收紧目录权限 (Windows 上 chmod 语义有限, 失败忽略, 不影响主流程)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,610 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.