Skills/ClawHub/xeonasr

xeonasr@0.1.4

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Automatically converts received voice messages to text via an external ASR service, supporting multiple audio formats and integrating with OpenClaw." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher aurora2035 · publishing for 244 daysInstalls 1,410Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 21 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.dpkg.cfg outside project
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/apt-get
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dpkg
0.1sprocessexited 100: E: Unable to acquire the dpkg frontend lock (/var/lib/dpkg/lock-frontend), are you root?
1.1sprocessdependency install exit 0
21snetworkCONNECT tcp://127.0.0.1:5002 · not in the allow-list, refused
21sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · (node:882) [UNDICI-EHPA] Warning: EnvHttpProxyAgent is experimental, expect them to change at any time. (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) [xeontts] workflow gateway listening on http://0.0.0.0:9002 [xeontts] upstream tts health: unreachable: fetch failed
21sprocessscript backend runs setup only
21sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
21sfilesystemread ~/.dpkg.cfg outside project
21sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
21sprocessexec /usr/bin/apt-get
21sprocessexec /usr/bin/dpkg
21sprocessexited 100: E: Unable to acquire the dpkg frontend lock (/var/lib/dpkg/lock-frontend), are you root?

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsetup_env.sh:117 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/miniconda.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsetup_env.sh:75 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegeselif command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstop_tts.sh:15 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$PID_9002" 2>/dev/null || kill -9 "$PID_9002" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart_tts_service.sh:31 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [[ -f "$PID_FILE" ]] && kill -0 "$(cat "$PID_FILE")" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionserver.js:143 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[xeontts] auto-cleaned expired files: references=${removedReferences}, outputs=${removedOutputs}, retentionDays=${config.fileRetentionDays}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstop_tts.sh:9 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$PID" 2>/dev/null || kill -9 "$PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈788 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim aurora2035: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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