Skills/ClawHub/x-tag-responder

x-tag-responder@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Detects when a human tags their AI familiar in someone else's X/Twitter thread, fetches full conversation context, infers intent, and crafts an appropriate r..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher m-lwatcher · publishing for 233 daysInstalls 724Last detonated 32 min ago
$clawhub install x-tag-responder
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/reply-bot.js:251 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[reply] Post failed: ${e.message?.slice(0, 100)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/reply-bot.js:240 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[reply] ✅ Posted! ID: ${replyId}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationSKILL.md:235 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials- Credentials are handled by `xurl` internally; do not pass tokens as CLI flags in agent context.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,892 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.