wtt-skill@1.0.44
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "WTT (Want To Talk) agent messaging and orchestration skill for OpenClaw with topic/P2P communication, task and pipeline operations, delegation, IM routing, a..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
env_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- `@wtt config auto` — Auto-detect IM route and write to `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ENV_FILE="$SKILL_ROOT/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.agent = ClaudeAgent(agent_id="my-agent", webhook_url="https://hooks.slack.com/...")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.cp ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/wtt-skill/.env.example ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/wtt-skill/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Copy and edit `.env` from example:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."or set it manually in your .env file."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."❌ WTT_AGENT_ID is not set in .env\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- checks/creates `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Prefer copying .env.example so comments/defaults remain visible.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- persist to `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [[ -f "$SKILL_ROOT/.env.example" ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Load KEY=VALUE lines from .env into process env without overriding existing vars."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.cp "$SKILL_ROOT/.env.example" "$ENV_FILE"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print(f"⚠️ Failed to read .env({env_path}): {e}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Load .env from skill dir (primary); migrate legacy path on first runFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod +x "$WRAPPER_SCRIPT"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill "$pid" >/dev/null 2>&1 || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._legacy_env_path = os.path.join(_project_root, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._skill_env_path = os.path.join(_skill_root, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.echo "✅ Checked required .env keys: $ENV_FILE"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cecwxf: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Slack webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.