Skills/ClawHub/wsl-service-deploy

wsl-service-deploy@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "WSL Ubuntu 服务一键部署。通过 wsl.exe + su -c root + aptitude,无需 SSH 即可在 Windows 宿主机上安全、快速地安装和管理后端服务。 覆盖 MySQL、Redis、Nginx、PostgreSQL、MongoDB 等任意 aptitude 可搜到的包。适用场景:..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher microsnow · publishing for 153 daysInstalls 521Last detonated 27 h ago
$clawhub install wsl-service-deploy
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:34 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x /tmp/install_<service>.sh'Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:103 · Destructive file system command detected- 安装前清理残留锁文件:`rm -f /var/lib/dpkg/lock* /var/lib/apt/lists/lock /var/cache/apt/archives/lock`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:18 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges2. **以 root 执行** — 使用 `echo '<root密码>' | su -c '<命令>' - root` 绕过 sudo 密码Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈812 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.