Skills/ClawHub/wordpress-receipts

wordpress-receipts@0.1.6

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Publish WordPress posts with API and public URL receipts." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher leostehlik · publishing for 182 daysInstalls 760Last detonated 30 min ago
$clawhub install wordpress-receipts
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.1.3

vet-skills diff wordpress-receipts 0.1.3 0.1.6

This version reaches for something 0.1.3 did not: 3 new credential variables (WORDPRESS_APPLICATION_PASSWORD, WORDPRESS_APP_PASSWORD, WORDPRESS_AUTHOR_ID). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New credential variables
WORDPRESS_APPLICATION_PASSWORD, WORDPRESS_APP_PASSWORD, WORDPRESS_AUTHOR_ID

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 2: }
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 2: }
0.3sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:120 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--env-file .env.wordpress \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:76 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesnode scripts/wp-verify-receipt.js --env-file .env.wordpress --id 456Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/wp-publish-receipt.js:115 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, action: 'draft-created', id: post.id, status: verified.status, title, link: verified.link, publicStatus: null }, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/wp-publish-receipt.js:121 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…hod: 'GET', ...requestOptions() }); const ok = publicRes.status === 200; console.log(JSON.stringify({ ok, action: 'published', id: post.id, status: verified.status, author: verified.author, categories: verified.cate…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/wp-verify-receipt.js:93 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ ok, id: post.id, date: post.date, status: post.status, title: post.title?.rendered, link: url, publicStatus: publicRes.status }, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:75 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesnode scripts/wp-verify-receipt.js --env-file .env.wordpress --id 456 --url https://example.com/post-slug/Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesnode scripts/wp-verify-receipt.js --env-file .env.wordpress --date 2026-07-01Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/mock-fetch.mjs:16 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn Response.json(post);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--env-file .env.wordpress \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/mock-fetch.mjs:18 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (url.includes('/posts?')) return Response.json(scenario === 'duplicate-failure' ? [post] : []);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/mock-fetch.mjs:19 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn Response.json(post);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,449 tok
1 file · 13 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.