Skills/ClawHub/win-loss-review

win-loss-review@0.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Run a monthly win-loss review of your CRM's closed deals, landed in context/ as one pull request: the ICP verified against won versus lost with a disqualifier, dated insights with counts and denominators, objections from recorded lost reasons, and a client file per closed-won account; a five-line Slack digest says what changed. Never edits a persona, nor the ICP after the first pass. Triggers: "verify our ICP against won and lost deals", "what do closed-lost deals say about who we should not sell to", "keep the context repo current from the CRM every month", "our lost reasons should become objections", "run a monthly win-loss review". Cargo project, harness claudeCode, HubSpot, Salesforce, Attio, Slack. Skip when: there is no CRM yet and the context should come from the website, which is web-capture; or you want one account researched before a call, which is research-account." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cargo-ai · publishing for 258 daysInstalls 442Last detonated 25 min ago
$clawhub install win-loss-review
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.1.2

vet-skills diff win-loss-review 0.1.2 0.2.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinfra/agents/win-loss-analyst.prompt.ts:99 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codecargo-ai if it is on PATH, otherwise npx --yes @cargo-ai/cli in its place):Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Text pushed off-screen by whitespaceSKILL.md:162 · Text pushed off-screen by whitespace| A harness does not bring its own model; this is what the monthly run is billed and metered against |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:117 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesnothing to `.env.example`:** nothing here holds a credential.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:161 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…leave `state` unset and deploy binds the project's connected state (`cargo.state.json`): its repository, directory and production branch. `cargo-ai project check` prints the binding; a project whose state is not connected deploys the agent…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Text pushed off-screen by whitespaceSKILL.md:158 · Text pushed off-screen by whitespace| The line is a number so nobody argues it per run |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Text pushed off-screen by whitespaceSKILL.md:157 · Text pushed off-screen by whitespace| Most portals record the reason on a custom property. Left wrong, the audit reports a team that never records reasons, and writes no objections, forever |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…he shape `cargo-ai project init` scaffolds). Nothing here needs a credential in .env, and nothing here reads calls, postings or the website." homepage: https://gith…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,379 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.