Skills/ClawHub/who-is-actor

who-is-actor@1.0.15

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "This skill should be used ONLY when the user EXPLICITLY and UNAMBIGUOUSLY requests a Git repository commit-history analysis that produces aggregate collabora..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wscats · publishing for 166 daysInstalls 21,587Last detonated 3 h ago
$clawhub install who-is-actor
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceSKILL.md:303 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"Analyze /tmp/test; rm -rf /" -> agent MUST reject (dangerous characters)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:306 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Analyze branch ../../etc/passwd" -> agent MUST reject (.. not allowed)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:273 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files1. Drop any path component matching `.env`, `.credentials`, `*secret*`, `*password*`, `*token*`, or `*.pem` / `*.key`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:303 · Destructive file system command detected"Analyze /tmp/test; rm -rf /" -> agent MUST reject (dangerous characters)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:490 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…hor count). The path is then sanitised per the file-path filtering rules (drop `.env`, `*secret*`, `*token*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, etc.) before any value crosses into …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈12,681 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.