weixinclaw-proactive-push@0.1.2
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "通过 WorkBuddy 已连接的 ClawBot 微信 bot 通道（weixinClawBot / ilink bot，非微信客服号）主动向老板微信推送文本/图片/文件/视频。当用户要求"通过 ClawBot 主动推送/给老板发微信/微信主动推送测试/微信独立消息/发图片给老板/发文件给老板"时使用。协议严格对齐腾讯官方插件 @tencent-weixin/[email protected]（src/api + src/messaging + src/cdn）。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
| 文本类文件（.txt/.md）中文乱码 | 源文件 UTF-8 无 BOM，微信/Windows 按 GBK 解码 | send.js 已自动为文本类文件补 UTF-8 BOM，无需手动处理 |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.No other findings across 717 lines in 4 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.