weekly-report-openclaw@1.0.0
BLOCKED· install onlyPublisher claims: "自动化工作周报生成系统。支持自动登录周报系统、获取团队周报数据、使用 AI 进行内容提炼总结、生成格式化的 Word 文档。 触发场景:(1) 用户要求生成周报 (2) 用户询问本周/上周工作总结 (3) 用户提到"周报"、"weekly report"、"工作总结" (4) 用户需要汇总团队成员工作内容" Observed in sandbox: sends data to www.google.com.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 41/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command. Summary: sends data to www.google.com.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
if sudo -n true 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x setup.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# chmod +x setup.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# Check if we have sudo accessFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.base_url: str = Field(default="http://120.210.237.117:7006/hap", description="Base URL of the weekly report system")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.env_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.system:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.echo " Ubuntu: sudo apt install python3 python3-pip python3-venv"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "Or with sudo: sudo uv run playwright install-deps chromium"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.base_url: str = Field(default="http://120.210.237.117:7006/hap", description="Base URL of the weekly report system")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print_warning "sudo access required for system dependencies"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary>手动安装(可选)</summary> 如果不想使用自动脚本,可以手动安装: ```bash # 安装 uv (Windows) irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex # 安装 uv (macOS/Linux) curl -LsSf https://astFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
39 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kaillera999: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.