Skills/ClawHub/wecom-agent-ops-center

wecom-agent-ops-center@2.4.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "企微 AI Agent 可观测性工具 — 心跳监控、进程守护、敏感信息扫描、网络白名单，2 分钟接入" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher mikeliang2000 · publishing for 166 daysInstalls 695Last detonated 4 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpairing-server-correct.js:499 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(' 消息转换: POST /api/convert/...');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddeploy-v2.4.0.sh:45 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -9 $pid 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart-e2e.sh:68 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processestrap "echo ''; echo '🛑 停止服务...'; kill $AGENT_PID $CONNECTOR_PID 2>/dev/null; echo '👋 已停止'; exit 0" INT TERMFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpairing-server.js:411 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` POST /pair/disconnect — 断开配对`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy-pairing-server.sh:18 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsssh $SERVER "sudo mkdir -p $REMOTE_DIR && sudo chown ubuntu:ubuntu $REMOTE_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpairing-server-correct.js:498 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(' P2P 配对: POST /pair/... WS /ws');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy-pairing-server.sh:18 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesssh $SERVER "sudo mkdir -p $REMOTE_DIR && sudo chown ubuntu:ubuntu $REMOTE_DIR"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:99 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo systemctl enable --now wecom-agent-ops-centerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddeploy-v2.4.0.sh:36 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesecho " kill $pid ..."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddeploy-v2.4.0.sh:104 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesecho " 停止服务：kill $NEW_PID"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpairing-server-merged.js:563 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` P2P 配对: POST /pair/... WS /ws`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy-pairing-server.sh:30 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesssh $SERVER "sudo tee /etc/systemd/system/pairing-server.service > /dev/null << 'EOF'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddeploy-v2.4.0.sh:40 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# 强制 kill 残留进程Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpairing-server.js:409 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` POST /pair/join — 加入配对`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpairing-server-merged.js:564 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` 消息转换: POST /api/convert/...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddeploy-v2.4.0.sh:37 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $pid 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy-pairing-server.sh:48 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable pairing-server && sudo systemctl restart pairing-server"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpairing-server.js:408 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` POST /pair/generate — 生成配对码`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart-e2e.sh:36 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $AGENT_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,017 tok
1 file · 56 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mikeliang2000: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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