Skills/ClawHub/wechat-to-shopify-blog

wechat-to-shopify-blog@2.1.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Convert an owned or authorized WeChat Official Account article into a Shopify blog draft. Use when the user provides a `mp.weixin.qq.com` URL and wants extra..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher lvsao · publishing for 118 daysInstalls 1,044Last detonated 7 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationSKILL.md:87 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials- `407`: fix proxy credentials in the runtime secret store; never paste them in chat.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lib/shopify-helpers.mjs:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn { ...env, SHOPIFY_STORE_DOMAIN: host, SHOPIFY_API_DOMAIN: host, SHOPIFY_TRANSPORT: isDevDashboardMode(env) ? "dev_dashboard_client_credentials" : "shopify_cli" };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentreferences/onboarding-guide.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGENERATED FILE: edit shared/shopify-admin-onboarding/core.md or manifest.json, then run node scripts/sync-onboarding.mjs --write.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/fetch-wechat-article.mjs:303 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, output: args.output, imageCount: images.length }, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/lib/shopify-dev-dashboard-auth.mjs:10 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…04"); const response = await fetch(`https://${shop}/admin/api/${version}/graphql.json`, { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Shopify-Access-Token": acce…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/fetch-wechat-article.mjs:306 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,962 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lvsao: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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