Skills/ClawHub/web-capture

web-capture@0.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Keep your company context current from your website and competitors' pages: each Monday your site, competitors' pages and news about both land in context/ as one pull request; the first run seeds positioning, offerings, an inferred ICP with a disqualifier, competitors, clients and proof, and every later run adds a dated note of what changed, never editing an existing file. Triggers: "keep our context current from our website", "watch competitor pricing pages", "add our company news to the knowledge base", "our context repo is empty, seed it from our website", "set up the workspace context from our domain". Cargo project, harness claudeCode, parallel, GitHub. Skip when: news about target accounts, which is monitor-buying-signals; one company researched before a call, which is research-account; or the ICP verified against won and lost deals, which is win-loss-review." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cargo-ai · publishing for 258 daysInstalls 443Last detonated 25 min ago
$clawhub install web-capture
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.1.2

vet-skills diff web-capture 0.1.2 0.2.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:146 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…leave `state` unset and deploy binds the project's connected state (`cargo.state.json`): its repository, directory and production branch. `cargo-ai project check` prints the binding; a project whose state is not connected deploys the agent…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…he shape `cargo-ai project init` scaffolds). Nothing here needs a credential in .env, and nothing here reads a CRM, a call or Slack." homepage: https://github.com/g…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinfra/agents/web-scribe.prompt.ts:171 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeon PATH, otherwise npx --yes @cargo-ai/cli in its place in every commandFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:113 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesnothing to `.env.example`:** nothing here holds a credential.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Text pushed off-screen by whitespaceSKILL.md:145 · Text pushed off-screen by whitespace| A harness does not bring its own model; this is what the weekly run is billed and metered against |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Text pushed off-screen by whitespaceSKILL.md:143 · Text pushed off-screen by whitespace| A page not listed is a change never seen |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,766 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.