Skills/ClawHub/vmware-privateai

vmware-privateai@2.5.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Use for VMware Private AI Foundation with NVIDIA on vSphere 9.x/VCF 9.1: GPU inventory/readiness/utilization, vGPU consumers and profiles, DirectPath catalog, vGPU assignment, and PAIS served models, knowledge bases, catalogs/data sources and MCP gallery. Trigger on "list GPU hosts", "which VMs use a vGPU", "GPU utilization", "assign a vGPU profile" or "list served models" in VMware/NVIDIA context. Supporting commands check access, estimate model sizing locally and inspect local air-gap bundles without contacting a model provider. For backing VM power/snapshot/clone/migrate use vmware-aiops, general health/alarms vmware-monitor, or GPU-enabled Tanzu Kubernetes vmware-vks." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zw008 · publishing for 186 daysInstalls 1,768Last detonated 8d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

What changed since 2.5.1

vet-skills diff vmware-privateai 2.5.1 2.5.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.5.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

2.5.1 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:215 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesadd that line to `~/.vmware-privateai/.env` and `chmod 600` it, or export it (from a secret manager).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:240 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesonly; passwords and the PAIS bearer token live in `~/.vmware-privateai/.env` (0600, obfuscated toFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:77 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsthe PAIS bearer token live in `~/.vmware-privateai/.env` (chmod 600). See `references/setup-guide.md`.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:215 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsadd that line to `~/.vmware-privateai/.env` and `chmod 600` it, or export it (from a secret manager).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesthe PAIS bearer token live in `~/.vmware-privateai/.env` (chmod 600). See `references/setup-guide.md`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,284 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zw008: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim zw008Propose a patch to the maintainer