Skills/ClawHub/vmware-debug

vmware-debug@2.4.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Use to diagnose VMware/vSphere/ESXi/NSX incidents: errors, log dumps, slow VMs, disconnected hosts, or an unexplained failure. Correlates companion-skill evidence into a timeline, ranks root-cause hypotheses, and recommends the next check. Trigger on "diagnose this VMware issue", "why is my VM slow", "troubleshoot this vSphere error" or "what does this log mean". Its CLI/MCP tools make no VMware API calls or repairs; optional Python host bindings call explicitly supplied companion MCP sessions; writes local case records and a separate audit trail. Default stdio is local; optional authenticated HTTPS uses caller tokens and TLS files. Route fixes to vmware-aiops (single action) or vmware-pilot (gated workflow), and routine inventory/health without an incident to vmware-monitor." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zw008 · publishing for 188 daysInstalls 2,278Last detonated 33 min ago
$clawhub install vmware-debug
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 2.3.3

vet-skills diff vmware-debug 2.3.3 2.4.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.3.3 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

2.3.3 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:266 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesDo not open `.env` files to diagnose; case folders are kept until you delete them.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:265 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestoken, or the contents of a `.env` file, in any evidence `summary`, `query` or `payload`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,013 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.