video-project-github@1.0.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Keep an AI video project, or any agent-built project, in a private GitHub repo, even when the person has never used git. The agent does everything: creates the private repo, keeps keys out, saves a version after every approved step, stores big video and audio outside git so GitHub's 100 MB limit never hits, and restores the whole project byte for byte on a new laptop. Sets up the folder layout for mood boards, script, sound, characters, blockout, shots and the edit as text (HyperFrames, Remotion, ffmpeg), records the prompt, model, seed and cost of every take, and gives an undo for anything. Use for "put this on GitHub", "back up my video project", "don't lose my work", "undo", "go back to the old version", "move to a new computer", "organize my project folder", "file structure for an AI video", "edit video in the terminal", "git for video". Not for one-off clips with no later edits, or for teams already happy with their own git setup." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-04 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vargai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.