Skills/ClawHub/vibo-skillqa

vibo-skillqa@0.2.8

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Test and certify AI agent skills: 7 automated checks, grade A–D, certificate. Use when asked to check, test, review, or certify a skill before publishing. Use ONLY with the user's explicit consent: SkillQA reads the skill folder (incl. .env-like files, for masked secret findings), checks local skill-library metadata for novelty, writes reports locally and a machine-bound license file — tell the user what will be scanned and where reports are saved." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher vnbochkarev-netizen · publishing for 77 daysInstalls 615Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskillqa.py:216 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"check.env_secrets.dev": "все значения в .env — dev-заглушки (test/changeme/пример)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskillqa.py:215 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"check.env_secrets.fail": "прод-секреты в .env-файлах: {items}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmodules/log.py:324 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 4a. env-file secrets (.env*) — classified, masked (ТЗ 20.08)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskillqa.py:218 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"check.env_secrets.ok": ".env-файлов нет или они пустые",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmodules/log.py:75 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# --- env-file secret scanning (ТЗ 20.08: .env* coverage + classification) ---Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskillqa.py:217 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"check.env_secrets.unknown": "пограничные значения в .env (проверить вручную): {items}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdescription: "Test and certify AI agent skills: 7 automated checks, grade A–D, certificate. Use when asked to check, test, review, or certify a skill before publishing. Use ONLY with the user's explicFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmodules/static.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env", "config.json", "config.yaml", "templates/_quick_index.json",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmodules/log.py:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(?:^|/)\.[^/]*env(?:\.|$)" # .env, .env.production, .env.localFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskillqa.py:343 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"check.env_secrets.fail": "production secrets in .env files: {items}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskillqa.py:1177 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskillqa.py:1058 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmodules/sandbox.py:257 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmodules/sandbox.py:177 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["unshare", "-n", "true"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmodules/static.py:141 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# dated artifacts (2026-06-21_zimage_hero.json) are generated outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈939 tok
1 file · 13 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vnbochkarev-netizen: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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