Skills/ClawHub/vibe-coding-rules

vibe-coding-rules@2.5.3

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "6个自我进化的AI编程纪律Skill。改代码前强制自查→安全执行→改后28条规则扫描→自动化测试→变更日志，一条龙闭环。 🍞独家面包屑系统：文件自动记住耦合关系和历史坑位。信任分级规则自生长：重复Bug升级为硬规则。 由代码小白用AI写14万行代码的踩坑经验沉淀。支持CodeBuddy/Cursor/Winds..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher ron-dali · publishing for 131 daysInstalls 484Last detonated 3d ago
$clawhub install vibe-coding-rules
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Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp

Static findings

HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filespipeline-init/SKILL.md:88 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesUsing the language chosen in Step 0, append to project's `.codebuddy/memory/MEMORY.md`:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageweb-testing/SKILL.md:48 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx playwright install chromiumFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsafe-terminal-executor/SKILL.md:60 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[1/3] POST ${options.hostname}:${options.port}${options.path}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsafe-terminal-executor/SKILL.md:33 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('[1/3] Sending request...');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinstall.sh:72 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeecho " npx playwright install chromium"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageweb-testing/SKILL.md:82 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx playwright install chromiumFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈9,221 tok
7 files · 24 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.