vault0@1.5.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Security suite for OpenClaw agents. Encrypted secret storage (AES-256-GCM), real-time activity monitoring via gateway WebSocket, policy enforcement, and native x402 payment wallet with EIP-3009 signing. Secure API keys, watch agent behavior, and handle machine-to-machine micropayments. macOS desktop app (Rust + Tauri). Reads ~/.openclaw/.env during hardening. Installation downloads a DMG from GitHub releases. After install, the app makes no external network calls and only listens on localhost." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher dlhugly · publishing for 280 daysInstalls 2,342Last detonated 7 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…e-to-machine micropayments. macOS desktop app (Rust + Tauri). Reads ~/.openclaw/.env during hardening. Installation downloads a DMG from GitHub releases. After inst…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:130 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /Applications/Vault-0.appFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:76 · Destructive file system command detected…mes/Vault-0/Vault-0.app" /Applications/ && hdiutil detach "/Volumes/Vault-0" && rm /tmp/Vault-0.dmg && echo "Vault-0 installed to /Applications" ``` ## Step 5: Lau…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencySKILL.md:140 · Unpinned dependency2. OpenClaw installed (`npm install -g openclaw@latest`)Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files1. API keys stored in plaintext, .env files, or config YAMLFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…s":"macos","minOS":"12","dependencies":["openclaw"],"configPaths":["~/.openclaw/.env","~/.openclaw/openclaw.json"],"networkAccess":"localhost-only-after-install","i…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:103 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileshead -1 ~/.openclaw/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesAfter the human confirms hardening is complete, verify the .env no longer contains plaintext keys:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,686 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dlhugly: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Unpinned dependencies≈ +1 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
  5. Unpinned dependency≈ +1 on the totalPin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
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