Skills/ClawHub/varg-publish-skill

varg-publish-skill@1.0.5

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Turn your agent skill into a varg how to listing: reads a skill folder or repo, checks it against the varg media skill standard, fills the one card format every listing on varg how to (varg.ai/how-to) uses — name, one-line summary, use-when triggers, category, install command, a real example of the output — shows it to the person and publishes it for review through the varg MCP publish_skill tool (or the API with a varg key). Use when someone says "publish my skill", "list this skill on varg", "submit my skill to varg how to", "add my skill to the catalog", "how do I get my skill found by agents", or the same in any language. Not for finding a skill (use how-to-make-ai-video), not for writing the skill itself, and not for contributing to the vargHQ/skills repo (that is a pull request)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher vargai · publishing for 215 daysInstalls 281Last detonated 28 h ago
$clawhub install varg-publish-skill
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:68 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code`curl | bash` or install hooks, scripts calling unknown hosts, bundled media without a license, no SKILL.md description.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:80 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code| `install` | The exact command from the repo's docs; else `npx skills add <owner>/<repo> --skill <name>` only when the folder sits where that CLI finds it; else leave out |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:68 · Remote installer piped to shell`curl | bash` or install hooks, scripts calling unknown hosts, bundled media without a license, no SKILL.md description.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGenerated by .github/readme/build.ts from SKILL.md files and .github/readme/*.json. Edit those and run `bun .github/readme/build.ts`; CI fails when this file isFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,546 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.