Skills/ClawHub/vagrant-skill

vagrant-skill@0.7.4

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Disposable VMs for safe testing — full sudo, Docker, Go, nested KVM, destroy and recreate. Use when you need a sandbox to build, test, or break things withou..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jpoley · publishing for 236 daysInstalls 1,155Last detonated 26 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Authorization escalation language. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.0sprocessexited 1: [ERROR] Must run as root
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.1sprocessexited 1: [ERROR] Must run as root

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:214 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesvagrant ssh -c "sudo iptables -L -n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:255 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesvagrant ssh -c "sudo iptables -A FORWARD -s 172.16.0.0/24 -j DROP"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:43 · Authorization escalation language**You (the agent) should NEVER need host-level sudo.** Instead, use this Vagrant workflow to get a fully provisioned, disposable VM where you have unrestricted root access.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:158 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash -Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:202 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Run any command with sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:9 · Authorization escalation languageor needs root access, network testing, or safe experimentation.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:158 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash -Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/setup.sh:106 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /usr/local/goFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:203 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesvagrant ssh -c "sudo apt-get install -y some-package"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:136 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod a+r /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.ascFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:256 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesvagrant ssh -c "sudo iptables -L -n -v"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:80 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod a+r /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.ascFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageskill-card.md:17 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file…rewall, systemd, and KVM-oriented experimentation. It is useful when work needs root access or isolation from the host environment. ### Deployment Geography for Use: Glo…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:17 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **Full sudo access** — agents and humans can do anything without risk to the hostFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,015 tok
2 files · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jpoley: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim jpoleyPropose a patch to the maintainer