uv-global@0.1.2
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Provision and reuse a global uv environment for ad hoc Python scripts." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
chmod a+x uvg*Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.command -v uv > /dev/null 2>&1 || brew install uv || (curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# create a .env file so you can add env vars to this uv env easilyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.command -v uv > /dev/null 2>&1 || brew install uv || (curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.UV_ENV_FILE=${UV_PROJECT}/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim guoqiao: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.