Skills/ClawHub/use-cursor

use-cursor@1.0.11

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Manage Cursor CLI tasks via tmux with security hardening" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher brucezhu888 · publishing for 234 daysInstalls 937Last detonated 30 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
7 of 7 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Destructive file system command detected; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocess7 of 7 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:153 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt install tmuxFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedextensions/use-cursor/index.js:49 · Destructive file system command detected* Input: task'; rm -rf /; echo 'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:116 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/doctor.sh:25 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeecho "✗ NOT FOUND - run: curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bash"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:159 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo yum install tmuxFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:38 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files- ✅ Reads `~/.cursor/cli-config.json` to check auth status (email **redacted** in output)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/doctor.sh:25 · Remote installer piped to shellecho "✗ NOT FOUND - run: curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bash"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedextensions/use-cursor/index.js:56 · Destructive file system command detected* "task'; rm /" → 'task'\''; rm /'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedextensions/use-cursor/index.js:51 · Destructive file system command detected* Step 2: Wrap in '...' → 'task'\''; rm -rf /; echo '\''Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:116 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedSKILL.md:349 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["agent", ...]) # No TTYFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedextensions/use-cursor/index.js:52 · Destructive file system command detected* Shell receives: literal string "task'; rm -rf /; echo '", no injectionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/doctor.sh:13 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "✗ NOT FOUND - run: sudo apt install tmux (or brew install tmux)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedextensions/use-cursor/index.js:50 · Destructive file system command detected* Step 1: Replace ' with '\'' → task'\''; rm -rf /; echo '\''Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,154 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim brucezhu888: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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