unihiker-k10-micropython@1.0.5
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Use when programming Unihiker K10 board with MicroPython, uploading code, flashing firmware, or accessing K10 MicroPython APIs (screen, sensors, RGB, audio, AI)" Observed in sandbox: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenariost+CategoryObserved action
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.local/bin/ outside project
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mv
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/setup.sh: line 64: sudo: command not found
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sfilesystemread ~/.local/bin/ outside project
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mv
0.2sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/setup.sh: line 64: sudo: command not found
Static findings
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup.sh:71 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code
AST06curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:64 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges
AST05mv bin/arduino-cli "${HOME}/.local/bin/" 2>/dev/null || sudo mv bin/arduino-cli /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup.sh:63 · Remote installer piped to shell
AST07curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:72 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges
AST05sudo mv bin/arduino-cli /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup.sh:63 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code
AST06curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/setup.sh:71 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source
AST06curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup.sh:71 · Remote installer piped to shell
AST07curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/setup.sh:63 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source
AST06curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Instructions loaded
≈2,338 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim rockets-cn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim rockets-cnPropose a patch to the maintainer