Skills/ClawHub/unihiker-k10-arduino

unihiker-k10-arduino@1.0.9

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Use when programming Unihiker K10 board with Arduino/C++, uploading code, flashing firmware, or accessing K10 Arduino APIs (screen, sensors, RGB, audio, AI,..." Observed in sandbox: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher rockets-cn · publishing for 115 daysInstalls 2,298Last detonated 4d ago

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.local/bin/ outside project
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mv
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/setup.sh: line 64: sudo: command not found
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sfilesystemread ~/.local/bin/ outside project
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mv
0.2sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/setup.sh: line 64: sudo: command not found

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/upload_k10.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([arduino_cli, "board", "list", "--format", "json"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:120 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mv arduino-cli /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/upload_k10.py:107 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([arduino_cli, "compile", "--fqbn", fqbn,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:64 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesmv bin/arduino-cli "${HOME}/.local/bin/" 2>/dev/null || sudo mv bin/arduino-cli /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup.sh:71 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/setup.sh:71 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/upload-arduino.sh:69 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegeslog_info " - Try running with sudo on Linux"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup.sh:63 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup.sh:71 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:72 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mv bin/arduino-cli /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup.sh:63 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/upload_k10.py:116 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([arduino_cli, "upload", "-p", port, "--fqbn", fqbn,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:115 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt install arduino-cliFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/setup.sh:63 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/arduino/arduino-cli/master/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,260 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim rockets-cn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim rockets-cnPropose a patch to the maintainer