Skills/ClawHub/twitter-command

twitter-command@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Use twitter-cli for ALL Twitter/X operations — reading tweets, posting, replying, quoting, liking, retweeting, following, searching, user lookups. Invoke whe..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher flyingtimes · publishing for 251 daysInstalls 1,072Last detonated 1 h ago
$clawhub install twitter-command
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 13 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'click'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'bs4'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'yaml'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'rich'
0.5sprocess8 of 13 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtwitter_cli/auth.py:458 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:147 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"profile_image_url_https": "https://img/dan.jpg"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:141 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"screen_name": "dan"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:145 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"screen_name": "dan",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:140 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"name": "Dan",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:144 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"name": "Dan",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,716 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

twitter-command@0.1.0 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills