Skills/ClawHub/twitter-cli

twitter-cli@0.5.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Use twitter-cli for ALL Twitter/X operations — reading tweets, posting, replying, quoting, liking, retweeting, following, searching, user lookups. Invoke whe..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jackwener · publishing for 252 daysInstalls 832Last detonated 28 min ago
$clawhub install twitter-cli
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:140 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"name": "Dan",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:144 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"name": "Dan",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:141 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"screen_name": "dan"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtwitter_cli/auth.py:241 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:145 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"screen_name": "dan",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/home_timeline.json:147 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"profile_image_url_https": "https://img/dan.jpg"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,366 tok
1 file · 35 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.