tvs-cc-migrator@1.0.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Claude Code 配置迁移工具。备份和恢复 ~/.claude/ 下的所有配置（CLAUDE.md、rules、skills、commands、agents、自定义插件、settings.json 等）。当用户提到备份配置、迁移 Claude Code、导出设置、恢复配置、换电脑等场景时使用此 skill。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
copyFileSync(join(CLAUDE_DIR, 'settings.json'), join(outputDir, 'settings.json'))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.No other findings across 936 lines in 4 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.