Skills/ClawHub/tuzi-nano-banana

tuzi-nano-banana@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Generate/edit images via Tuzi API (default), Google Gemini, OpenAI, DashScope, Replicate. Text-to-image + image-to-image editing; 1K/2K/4K resolution. Use fo..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher ljquan · publishing for 258 daysInstalls 1,386Last detonated 2 h ago
$clawhub install tuzi-nano-banana
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:97 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files**Load Priority**: CLI `--api-key` > env vars > `<cwd>/.tuzi-skills/.env` > `~/.tuzi-skills/.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:22 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/main.ts --prompt "your image description" --filename "output.png" [--resolution 1K|2K|4K] [--provider tuzi|google|openai|dashscope|replicate] [--model MODEL_ID]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/main.ts:173 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Loaded input image: ${args.inputImage}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:37 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- `npx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/main.ts --prompt "<draft prompt>" --filename "yyyy-mm-dd-hh-mm-ss-draft.png" --resolution 1K`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:41 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- `npx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/main.ts --prompt "<final prompt>" --filename "yyyy-mm-dd-hh-mm-ss-final.png" --resolution 4K`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/main.ts:83 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst cwdEnv = await loadEnvFile(path.join(process.cwd(), ".tuzi-skills", ".env"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:27 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/main.ts --prompt "editing instructions" --filename "output.png" --input-image "path/to/input.png" [--resolution 1K|2K|4K]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/main.ts:82 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst homeEnv = await loadEnvFile(path.join(homedir(), ".tuzi-skills", ".env"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/main.ts:195 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`\nImage saved: ${outputPath}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,304 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.