turnstile-spin@1.0.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Set up Cloudflare Turnstile end-to-end in a project — scan the codebase, create the widget via the Cloudflare API, deploy the managed siteverify Worker, writ..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
…er to add `Account.Turnstile:Read` to the token, or fall back to asking them to paste the secret. In the paste path, you do not have `clearance_level` or `domains`; ask the use…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod +x "$TARGET_DIR/scripts"/*.sh 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* npx vitest run test/deploy.test.tsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx wrangler turnstile widget show "${WIDGET_ID}" | \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.whoami_json=$(npx wrangler whoami --json 2>/dev/null || true)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.execSync(`npx wrangler delete --name ${workerName} 2>&1 || true`, { stdio: 'ignore' });Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…only the secret-put using the returned `worker_name`: `echo "$WIDGET_SECRET" \| npx wrangler secret put TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY --name <worker_name>`. Surface the `detail` fie…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.(cd "$DEPLOY_DIR" && npx wrangler deploy --name "$target_name") >"$deploy_log" 2>&1Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.echo "$WIDGET_SECRET" | (cd "$DEPLOY_DIR" && npx wrangler secret put TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY --name "$NAME") >"$secret_log" 2>&1Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…sing-input-secret` | Secret didn't propagate. Re-set: `echo "$WIDGET_SECRET" \| npx wrangler secret put TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY --name <worker_name from worker-deploy.sh outpu…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx --yes degit cloudflare/skills/skills/turnstile-spin/templates/worker "$DEPLOY_DIR" >/dev/null 2>&1Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…]** Do NOT present a plan yet. Auth + scan come first. 2. **Wrangler check.** `npx wrangler --version`. If missing, ask once: "Install wrangler with `npm install --save-de…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…` is not set on it; surface the error, then retry with `echo "$WIDGET_SECRET" | npx wrangler secret put TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY --name <returned worker_name>` before running v…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.if ! npx --yes degit cloudflare/skills/skills/turnstile-spin "$TARGET_DIR" >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.