Skills/ClawHub/tool-enhancement

tool-enhancement@1.0.5

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "🚀 55+ 增强工具集 - 为 OpenClaw 赋能。文件操作、Shell执行、Git工作流、网页请求、子Agent调度、分层记忆、终端UI,一应俱全。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher ntaffffff · publishing for 231 daysInstalls 840Last detonated 1 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cut
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.1sprocessexited 128: fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: AttributeError: type object 'Fore' has no attribute 'RESET'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.7sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.8sprocess8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandtools/exec_tools.py:5 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges提供命令执行、后台进程、sudo 等能力Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetools/exec_tools.py:65 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicedangerous = ["rm -rf /", "mkfs", "dd if=/dev/zero", ":(){:|:&};:"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/agent_tools.py:420 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandtools/exec_tools.py:330 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# 构建 sudo 命令Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedtools/exec_tools.py:65 · Destructive file system command detecteddangerous = ["rm -rf /", "mkfs", "dd if=/dev/zero", ":(){:|:&};:"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandtools/exec_tools.py:315 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"password": {"type": "string", "description": "sudo 密码(可选,默认从 stdin 读取)"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/agent_tools.py:335 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandtools/exec_tools.py:310 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesdescription="使用 sudo 执行特权命令",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandtools/exec_tools.py:305 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"""sudo 命令执行工具"""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/session_tools.py:158 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtools/discovery.py:239 · Dynamic module loadingmodule = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/agent_tools.py:538 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetools/schema.py:394 · Python exec or eval of computed coderesult = eval(expression) # 注意:生产环境应该用 ast 解析Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/session_tools.py:81 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/agent_tools.py:492 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/agent_tools.py:451 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/agent_tools.py:545 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtools/discovery.py:240 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,438 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ntaffffff: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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