tool-enhancement@1.0.5
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "🚀 55+ 增强工具集 - 为 OpenClaw 赋能。文件操作、Shell执行、Git工作流、网页请求、子Agent调度、分层记忆、终端UI,一应俱全。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
提供命令执行、后台进程、sudo 等能力Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.dangerous = ["rm -rf /", "mkfs", "dd if=/dev/zero", ":(){:|:&};:"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# 构建 sudo 命令Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.dangerous = ["rm -rf /", "mkfs", "dd if=/dev/zero", ":(){:|:&};:"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."password": {"type": "string", "description": "sudo 密码(可选,默认从 stdin 读取)"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.description="使用 sudo 执行特权命令",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""sudo 命令执行工具"""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = eval(expression) # 注意:生产环境应该用 ast 解析Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ntaffffff: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.