Skills/ClawHub/tinker-orca

tinker-orca@1.3.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Stop editing files one at a time. ORCA drafts every change in parallel, then applies them per-file-serialized so disjoint files fly and shared files never collide. It SPAWNS SUBAGENTS on your own provider (one per unit, which costs money) and writes ONLY the repo-relative files you list. Patches that name any other file are rejected in code. Because a symlinked path component can carry a write outside the repository, a separate checker agent resolves every path before any writer is spawned and again after apply, and lists the change set git can see; code refuses or fails the units it flags. The writers and checkers are ordinary subagents running as your user: the checkers are told not to write and their output is self-reported, and git cannot see writes outside the repository — this is detection, not a sandbox. Committing rewrites git history and needs commit AND confirmedCommit; it is OFF by default and never inferred. In its default mode it creates a git worktree and branch per unit-group and removes them afterwards. It runs an external program ONLY when you pass its absolute path IN THE CALL — no environment variable can name one. See Permissions, Data Flow and Consent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher globalcaos · joined 0 days agoInstalls 541Last detonated 2 h ago

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/selftest.mjs:131 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/parallel-implement.workflow.js:195 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/selftest.mjs:386 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/selftest.mjs:181 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/parallel-implement.workflow.js:416 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/selftest.mjs:179 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/selftest.mjs:387 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/selftest.mjs:131 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/selftest.mjs:112 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,295 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim globalcaos: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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