tiktok-android@1.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Automate TikTok engagement on Android using ADB. Search topics, comment with AI or templates, includes setup wizard. Use for TikTok automation campaigns and building social presence through strategic commenting." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 52/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
result = subprocess.run(["adb", "devices"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print("(This will be stored in .env file, not committed to git)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(["adb", "devices"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.1. API key in `.env` fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Setup saves to `config.py` and `.env` (both gitignored).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if os.path.exists(".env"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.os.system("python3 setup.py")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.with open(".env", 'w') as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.with open(".env", 'r') as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(["adb", "devices"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Save AI API key to .env if AI modeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.**API key in .env:**Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- `.env` - API key (if AI mode)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
28 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mladjan: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.