three-party-adversarial-review@2.5.1
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "开发完成后的三方对抗式代码评审闭环:蓝军(敌意审查,须给证据链)→ 第三方(独立审计,不信双方文档、只读代码,专找"修改引入的新缺陷"并稽核蓝军漏审的维度)→ 中立裁定(逐条采纳/驳回、审查双方共同前提)。当用户说"蓝军评审""第三方复核""对抗性审查""红蓝互搏""三方评审""交叉验证""发布前审查""帮我挑刺""adversarial review""red team review""pre-release review""critique this""find bugs in my code"或要求提升代码质量、准备发布前把关时使用。也适用于用户想把当前会话变成"多个 Agent 互搏"来提升代码水平的场景。" Observed in sandbox: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-30 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenariost+CategoryObserved action
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.netrc
0.1snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.1sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git
0.1sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git-remote-https
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.1sprocessexited 1: [31m[fail][0m git clone failed. Check network access to https://github.com/RevolutionLA/adversarial-review.git
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/check-report.mjs:126 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/check-report.mjs:118 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/check-report.mjs:109 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06What would make this Verified
19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim revolutionla: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim revolutionla