Skills/ClawHub/terminal-killer

terminal-killer@1.2.0

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "Intelligent shell command detector and executor for OpenClaw. Automatically identifies terminal commands (system builtins, $PATH executables, history matches..." Observed in sandbox: sends data to www.baidu.com.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cosperypf · publishing for 261 daysInstalls 1,882Last detonated 42 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 47/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: sends data to www.baidu.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1snetworkGET http://www.baidu.com/ · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/which
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: Usage: node detect-command.js "<user input>"
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Usage: node exec-command.js "<command>"
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: Usage: node index.js "<user input>"
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: node interactive.js "docker exec -it container bash"
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/which
0.7sprocessexited 1:
0.7sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicescripts/detect-command.js:24 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device'rm -rf /',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/test-detector.js:42 · Destructive file system command detected{ input: 'rm -rf /', expected: 'ASK', description: 'Dangerous delete' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:153 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- `dd`, `mkfs`, `chmod 777`Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicescripts/test-detector.js:43 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device{ input: 'sudo rm -rf /', expected: 'ASK', description: 'Dangerous sudo' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/detect-command.js:24 · Destructive file system command detected'rm -rf /',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicescripts/test-detector.js:42 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device{ input: 'rm -rf /', expected: 'ASK', description: 'Dangerous delete' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/test-detector.js:43 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges{ input: 'sudo rm -rf /', expected: 'ASK', description: 'Dangerous sudo' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/test-detector.js:43 · Destructive file system command detected{ input: 'sudo rm -rf /', expected: 'ASK', description: 'Dangerous sudo' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:151 · Destructive file system command detected- `rm -rf /` or similar destructive patternsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/detect-command.js:28 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions'chmod 777',Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/test-detector.js:62 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`✅ PASS: "${test.input}"`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/detect-command.js:29 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions'chown -R',Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/demo-long-output.js:40 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(result.execution.output.substring(0, 200) + '...');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/test-detector.js:65 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`❌ FAIL: "${test.input}"`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/exec-command.js:76 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,227 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

33 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cosperypf: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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