Skills/ClawHub/terabox-storage

terabox-storage@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Manage TeraBox cloud storage operations including login, upload, download, share, and transfer. Use the terabox CLI tool for file management tasks." Observed in sandbox: sends data to s5.teraboxcdn.com.

Registry ClawHubPublisher arthurpatten · publishing for 239 daysInstalls 995Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: sends data to s5.teraboxcdn.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://s5.teraboxcdn.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/basename
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.1sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://s5.teraboxcdn.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/basename
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.2sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/update.sh:216 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$HOME/.local/bin/terabox"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationSKILL.md:77 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime- CLI auto-update is handled automatically by the CLI itself (built-in update check on every command execution)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:92 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesterabox upload ./file.txt --progress # Show upload progressFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:91 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesterabox upload ./file.txt docs/ # Upload to docs directoryFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:166 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$TERABOX_BIN"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationSKILL.md:75 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime1. Run Skill auto-update (silently, do not block on failure):Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:90 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesterabox upload ./file.txt # Upload to root directoryFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,980 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim arthurpatten: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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